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NEW YORK'S LABOR LAW SECTION 240: HAS IT BEEN
NARROWED OR EXPANDED BY THE COURTS BEYOND THE
LEGISLATIVE INTENT?
BARRY R. TEMKIN'

I.

INTRODUCTION

On Tuesday, July 21, 1998, a twenty five story elevator support
tower collapsed during construction of the new Conde Nast building on
West 43rd Street in Manhattan, showering Times Square with tons of
deadly debris from the 700-foot-high scaffolding and killing an eightyfive-year-old woman in a nearby hotel room. 2 Three hundred feet of scaffolding materials were hurled to the street and buildings below. 3 New
York City Buildings Commissioner Gaston Silva described the collapse
'
as "the most serious and dramatic construction failure of this decade.
The disaster closed the Times Square area for days, and riveted public
attention as never before on the risks and dangers inherent in the use of
scaffolding in industrial construction. 5 Although no workers were injured, it is not unlikely that the Times Square tragedy will lead to heightened awareness and scrutiny of the laws governing the safety of workers
on scaffolds at construction job sites.
Few areas in the field of tort litigation are as significant yet misunderstood as the so-called "Scaffold Act," 6 embodied in Article 10 of the
1. Barry R. Temkin is a senior trial attorney at Jacobowitz Garfinkel & Lesman in
Manhattan, a former Assistant District Attorney in Kings County, and a 1982 graduate of
the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Mr. Temkin received a B.A. (magna cum
laude) in 1979 from the University of Rochester. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Robert Travisano in researching the legislative history of the Labor Law,
and of Janice Tuchman for her assistance in researching the Times Square disaster.
2. See Steven Greenhouse, Scaffold Collapses, Paralyzing Times Square, N.Y.
TR.vEs, July 22, 1998, at Al.
3. See Nadine M. Post, Causes Probed as CrippledHoist Comes Slowly Down,
ENGINEERING NEwS RECoRD, August 10, 1998, at 10.
4. See David W. Chen, Mayor Faults Offer of Aid for Victims of Collapse, N.Y.
TIMEs, July 24, 1998, at B5.
5. See Making Times Square Safe, N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1998, at A12; Times
Squares Troubles Probed,ENGINEERING NEWS RECORD, August 24, 1998, at 12.
6. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 240 (1999 Pocket Part, Historical and Statutory Notes).

NEW YORK LA WSCHOOL LA4 WREVIEW

[Vol. 44

New York State Labor Law 7 which obligates contractors and landowners to protect the safety of workers on scaffolds, ladders, and other
height-related devices. No less an authority than New York's Chief
Judge Judith Kaye recently acknowledged "the highly elusive goal of
defining with precision statutory terms within Labor Law Article 10 so
as to minimize the need for litigation."8 Judge Kaye's goal is elusive indeed, with a significant rift emerging among the four departments of the
Appellate Division, yielding conflicting interpretations of a judicially
crafted exception to the Labor Law. More specifically, the Appellate
Division departments are in disagreement as to the definition and the
scope of the "routine cleaning and maintenance" exception to Labor Law
Section 240. In fact, both the Court of Appeals9 and the Appellate Division l° have explicitly acknowledged the conflict, yet it remains far from
resolved.' As will be suggested in this article, in light of the strict liability imposed on owners and contractors under Article 10 of the Labor
Law, the courts have created the routine cleaning and maintenance exception, which has no support in the legislative history, in order to prevent excessive and, occasionally, absurd coverage of routine activity.
In a closely related problem, the departments of the Appellate Division had been grappling with the scope of coverage of the Labor Law,
specifically, whether the strict liability protection of the Scaffold Act is
available to all work-related falls from a height, or whether the statute is
limited to injuries taking place at traditional construction sites. This issue was resolved 2 by the Court of Appeals' 1998 decision in Joblon v.
Solow,13 which extended the reach of Sections 240 and 241 of the Labor
Law to accidents occurring away from construction sites.' 4 In so doing, it
will be argued, the Court has extended the scope of absolute liability afforded by the Labor Law substantially beyond that intended by the Leg7. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 240 (MeKinney 1986).
8. Joblon v. Solow, 695 N.E.2d 237,239 (N.Y. 1998).
9. See id. at 240.
10. See Malsch v. City of New York 662 N.Y.S.2d 458 (Ist Dep't 1997).
11. See, e.g., Kelner, Window Washers and Beyond: Labor Law Section 240(1),
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 22, 1998, at 3 ("The question has engendered inconsistent decisions at the
Appellate Division level.").
12. See id. at 7 (whether "cleaning" was "conducted at the site of a construction
project or in non-construction context," according to the author, "may now be resolved
by the Court of Appeal Decision in Joblon .. .
13. 695 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1998).
14. See id. at 242.
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islature, i.e., to afford protection to construction workers from the dangers of working on scaffolds. Indeed, in a footnote, 5 the Joblon Court
seemingly invited the Legislature to revise the Labor Law should it disagree with the Court's interpretation of its reach. In light of the absolute
liability imposed on owners and contractors for a statutory violation of
Section 240, the Legislature should seriously consider the Court of Appeals' invitation.
II.

SCOPE OF LABOR LAW SECTION

240

Section 240 of the New York Labor Law obligates contractors and
property owners to protect the safety of workers engaged in heightrelated construction of a building or structure. 16 The statute mandates
safety devices to protect employees engaged in building, demolition,
painting, cleaning, and other enumerated areas of construction work. In
its current format, Section 240(1) of the Labor Law provides that:
All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of
one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct
or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing a building or structure, shall
furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings,
hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices
which shall be so constructed, placed, and7 operated as to give
proper protection to a person so employed.'
Section 240 further imposes the requirement of a safety rail on outdoor scaffolding over twenty feet in height, 8 and mandates that all scaffolding be capable of bearing "four times the maximum weight
required
19
to be dependent therefrom or placed thereon when in use."'
Additional protections for workers engaged in construction, excavation, or demolition work are imposed by Section 241 of the Labor Law
which, among other things, obligates owners, contractors, and their
15. See id. at 241, n.2.
16. See N.Y. Lab. Law § 240 (MeKinney 1986).
17. Id.

18. See id. § 240(2).
19. Id. § 240(3).
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agents "to provide reasonable and adequate protection and safety" to persons working "or lawfully frequenting" a job site at which "construction,
excavation or demolition work is being performed."20 Section 241 further
requires compliance with safety regulations promulgated by the State
Department of Labor.21 Although the owner's and contractor's duties
under Labor Law Section 241 are not delegable, this is not a strict liability provision, and evidence of the plaintiff's comparative negligence is
admissible. 22 In contrast to Section 240, which holds the owner or contractor absolutely liable regardless of fault, Section 241 renders them
vicariously responsible 23for the negligence of others which contributed to
the plaintiff's accident.
Moreover, window cleaners are protected, in addition, by Section
202 of the Labor Law, which applies to "protection of the public and of
persons engaged at window cleaning and cleaning of exterior surfaces of
buildings."2 4 Window washers are entitled to the concurrent benefit of
both Sections 240 and 202, as the former and not the latter imposes absolute liability on owners and contractors.
The Court of Appeals, in interpreting the Labor Law, has recognized
the legislative intent of placing "ultimate responsibility for safety practices at building construction jobs where such responsibility actually belongs, on the owner and general contractor," rather than on workers who
are "scarcely in the position to protect themselves from accident., 26 Sec-

20. N.Y. Lab. Law § 241 (McKinney 1986).
21. See id. § 241 (Subsections 1 through 4 of Section 241 impose specific requirements for filling in or planking the floor of a building undergoing construction).
22. See Zimmer v. Chemung Co. Performing Arts, Inc., 482 N.E.2d 898, 901 (N.Y.
1985).
23. See Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contracting Co., 693 N.E.2d 1068 (N.Y. 1998)
(Section 241 "imposes a nondelegable duty upon an owner or general contractor to respond in damages for injuries sustained due to another party's negligence in failing to
conduct their construction, demolition or excavation operations so as to provide for the
reasonable and adequate protection of the persons employed therein"). Id. at 1070.
24. N.Y. Lab. Law § 202 (McKinney 1986).
25. See J.P. Miller, Williamson v. 16 West 57th Street Co., N.Y. L.J., December
28, 1998, at 30; See also Kelner, Window Washers and Beyond Labor Law Section
240(1), N.Y. L.J., Sept. 22, 1998, at 3 ("Although window washers have a statutory remedy under certain circumstances under Labor Law § 202, they are not precluded from
also seeking protection from the statutory absolute liability protection of Labor Law §
240(1).").
26. Zimmer v. Chemung County Performing Arts, Inc, 482 N.E.2d 898, 901 (N.Y.
1985) (quoting from Koenig v. Patrick Construction Company, 298 N.Y. 313, 318
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tion 240 "represents the culmination of a long legislative effort to provide safety and protection for persons using scaffolding and other devices. ' 27 The Court of Appeals has observed that "this statute is one for
the protection of workmen from injury and undoubtedly is to be construed as liberally as may be for the accomplishment of the purpose for
which is was thus framed." 28
The significance of Labor Law Section 240 in construction-related
tort litigation cannot be overstated. The statute imposes absolute liability
on contractors and owners for injuries that were proximately caused by
the lack or insufficiency of safety devices. 29 The plaintiff's comparative
negligence may not be asserted as a defense to such an action. Thus, the
New York Scaffold Law is a powerful weapon in the tort litigator's arsenal, and the crucial question of its applicability to a particular case is
likely to be determinative of its outcome, especially in situations where
there is evidence of comparative negligence on the part of the plaintiff.

III.

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

New York's Labor Law, including the scaffolding provisions of
Section 240, was enacted in 1921,31 as part of a comprehensive, 170page, 475-paragraph package of labor legislation32 which included laws
regulating child labor,33 sweatshops, 34 factory work, "washrooms for
every mercantile establishment, '3 5 explosives,3 6 and mines and tunnels.31

(1948)); accord, Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1993) ("The
purpose of the section is to protect workers by placing the ultimate responsibility for
work site safety on the owner and general contractor, instead of the worker themselves.").
27. Connors v. Boorstein, 173 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. 1958).
28. Quigley v. Thatcher, 207 N.Y. 66, 68 (1912) (quoting Zimmer, 482 N.E.2d 898,

901 (N.Y. 1985)).
29. See Gordon v. Eastern Ry. Supply, Inc., 626 N.E.2d 912, 914 (N.Y. 1993).
30. See, e.g., Douglas Wylly, Plaintiff's Negligence in Labor Law § 240 Cases,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 6, 1996, at 1.
31. N.Y. Labor Law § 240 is descended from the 1885 "Act for the protection of
life and limb," which imposed liability on anyone "who shall knowingly or negligently
furnish and erect ... improper scaffolding .... " Connors v. Boorstein, 173 N.Y.S.2d
288, 289 (N.Y. 1958). In contrast, the present day § 240 imposes liability for a failure to
provide proper protection, regardless of fault. See Zimmer v. Chemung Co. Performing
Arts, 482 N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 1985).
32. 1921 N.Y. Law Chap. 50.
33. See id. § 383.
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The original text of Labor Law Section 240 was entitled "Safe scaffolding required for use of employees," and required employers and supervisors properly to protect the safety of their workers on scaffolds:
A person employing or directing another to perform labor of any
kind in the erection, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or
pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause
to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor,
scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes and other mechanical contrivances
which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give
proper protection to a person so employed or directed.3 8
Other provisions required safety rails on scaffolds more that twenty
feet from the ground or floor, 9 and for all scaffolding to be able to bear
four times
"the maximum weight required to be dependent there40
from...."
The 1947 Amendments to the Labor Law41 changed the title of Section 240 to "Scaffolding and other devices for use of employees, ' 42 and
expanded the statute's coverage accordingly to workers falling from elevated devices other than scaffolds. As the State Labor Department explained, the bill was intended to cover additional height-related devices
beyond scaffolding, "in accordance with both modem construction
prac43
fices and what is believed to be the original intent of this section."
In an effort to clarify the scope of contractor responsibility for jobsite safety and reduce finger-pointing among contractors and subcontractors, the Legislature, in a 1969 amendment, changed the applicability
of Labor Law Section 240 from "[a] person employing or directing an34. See id. § 373-382.
35. Id. § 378.
36. See id. § 450-63.
37. Id. § 400-404.
38. 1921 N.Y. Laws Chap. 50, § 240. The above-quoted language is similar to and
derived from 1911 N.Y. Laws Chap. 693.
39. 1921 N.Y. Laws Chap. 50 § 240.
40. Id.
41. 1947 N.Y. Laws Chap. 683.
42. Id. at § 240 (emphasis added).
43. New York State Legislative Annual 188 (1947).
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other to perform labor," to "[a]ll contractors and owners and their
agents." 44 The purpose of the 1969 amendment was to place "responsibility for safety practices at building construction sites where such re'45
sponsibility actually belongs, on the owner and general contractor.'
The owner and general contractor should be responsible, reasoned the
bill's sponsors, because they hire and control the various building trades
at a construction
site and "are primarily responsible for the erection of
' 6
the building.
Only two further amendments have been made in Labor Law Section
240 since 1969: amendments exempting from coverage the owners of
one-and two-family homes who do not control or supervise work on the
house,47 and architects and engineers who do not actively supervise the
construction or demolition of a building. 48 The legislative history indicates that both exceptions were intended to protect persons who had no
control or supervision over daily worksite safety during construction or
demolition. 49 State Assemblyman Orazio, who introduced the 1981
amendment, noted in an accompanying memorandum that the underlying
statute applied to "the physical construction or demolition of a building.11,50
Thus, the development of the modem Labor Law evinces an intent to
require owners and contractors, at construction projects involving the
erection or demolition of a building or other structure, to take precautions
to ensure the proper protection of workers using scaffolding and other
height related devices. What was left to the courts was the definition and
application of statutory terms such as "cleaning" and "altering." This, as
will be seen, would be accomplished with inconsistent and sometimes,
illogical results.

44. 1969 N.Y. Laws Chap. 1108 § 1.
45. N.Y. State Legislative Annual 407 (1969) (memorandum by Senator Calandra
and Assemblymen Armen).
46. Id.
47. 1980 N.Y. Laws Chap. 670.
48. 1981 N.Y. Laws Chap. 241.
49. N.Y. State Legislative Annual 407 (1969) (memorandum of Assemblyman
Angelo F. Orazio); Letter from Florence Dreiezen, Deputy Industrial Commissioner,
State of N.Y. Dep't of Labor to Hon. Richard A. Brown, Counsel to the Governor of NY
(June 27, 1980) (on file with New York Law School Law Review); 1980 N.Y. Laws
Chap.670.
50. 1980 N.Y. State Leg. Ann., supra note 49.
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THE ROUTINE CLEANING AND MAINTENANCE EXCEPTION

Although Section 240 of the Labor Law, by its terms, explicitly protects workers involved in the "cleaning" of a building or structure, the
Court of Appeals has long held that the statute is inapplicable to routine
cleaning and maintenance. 5' In Connors v. Boorstein,52 the plaintiff was
a domestic employee who was injured when she fell from a step-ladder
"while cleaning a storm window on the outside of her employer's private
residence." 53 The Court of Appeals held that Labor Law Section 240 did
not apply to routine cleaning by a domestic worker because the statutory
protections were intended to benefit construction workers, reasoning: "It
follows, as a matter of logic and common sense, that the word 'cleaning'
as used in this context, has reference to the 'cleaning' incidental to
building construction, demolition and repair work and not to the cleaning
of the windows of a private dwelling by a domestic. 54
In Smith v. Shell Oil Company,55 the Court of Appeals declined to
extend Section 240 of the Labor Law to the claim of a worker who was
injured when he fell from a ladder while changing a light bulb in an illuminated sign at a gas station. In affirming summary judgment for the
defendant, the Court of Appeals reasoned that, "changing a light bulb is
not 'erection, demolition, repairing,
altering, painting, cleaning or point56
ing of a building or structure.'
The Court of Appeals next addressed the routine cleaning and maintenance doctrine in Brown v. ChristopherStreet Owners, Corp.,57 which
held that Section 240 of the Labor Law does not protect a window
washer who fell and injured himself while washing the exterior windows
of a residential apartment. In ruling that summary judgment had been
properly granted dismissing the plaintiff's complaint, the Court of Appeals held that the "cleaning" encompassed under the statute "does not

51. See Connors v. Boorstein, 173 N.Y.S.2d 288, 289 (N.Y. 1958).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 290. This aspect of Connors has been substantially eroded, if not overruled, by the Court of Appeals' 1998 decision in Joblon v. Solow, 672 N.Y.S.2d 286, 290,
discussed infra Part V.
55. 654 N.E.2d 1210 (N.Y. 1995).
56. 640 N.Y.S.2d at 963 (quoting from N.Y. Lab. Law § 240 (1)).
57. 663 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 1996).
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include the routine, household window washing at issue here,"5 8 distinguishing the case before it from cleaning all of the windows of a "large,
non-residential structure" such as a school. 59
A. Recent Second DepartmentCases
Application of the routine cleaning and maintenance doctrine has
been anything but uniform among the various departments of the Appellate Division. Recent decisions have placed the Second and Fourth Departments of the Appellate Divisions squarely at odds with the First Department in their interpretations of the routine cleaning and maintenance
exception to the Labor Law. For example, the Second Department, in a
string of cases, has followed Smith and Brown to hold that Labor Law
Section 240 is not applicable to injuries incurred while changing light
bulbs and cleaning light fixtures in a school auditorium, 60 opening an
elevator door with a broom handle in order to prepare the elevator for a
routine visit by exterminators,6 ' or changing light bulbs and tightening
loose wire nuts.62 Similarly, in Cosentino v. Long Island Railroad,63 the
Second Department held that Labor Law Section 240(1) was not applicable to a telephone company employee who had a height-related accident
while splicing telephone cables and picking up new lines at a subway
station. In rejecting the plaintiffs claim in Cosentino, the Second Department reasoned that:
It is clear that liability under Labor Law Section 240(1) was not
meant to apply to routine maintenance in a non-construction
context.... In view of the strict liability imposed by the statute
and the fact that such liability is generally imposed only to guard
against inordinate dangers, we find no reason to strain the language of the statute to encompass the routine activities involved
with telephone service, which is clearly distinguishable from the
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. See Bermel v. Board of Education, 647 N.Y.S.2d 548 (1996). But see Brown,
87 N.Y.2d at 940, in which the Court of Appeals suggested that washing the windows of
a school should be considered protected activity.
61. See Vanerstrom v. Strasser, 659 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1997).
62. See Haghighi v. Bailer, 657 N.Y.S.2d 774 (2d Dep't 1997).
63. 607 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1994).
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risks4 associated with the construction or demolition of a build6
ing.

B. Recent FirstDepartment Cases
The departments of the Appellate Division generally agree that while
changing light bulbs is not covered by the statute, replacing light fixtures
does bring an injured plaintiff within the ambit of Section 240(1) of the
67
66
65
Labor Law. Rulings in the First, Second, and Fourth Departments

have established that replacing a light fixture is different from replacing
a light bulb and thereby distinguishable from the type of routine cleaning
and maintenance described by the Court of Appeals in Brown and Smith.
However, the First Department has gone even further by holding that an
injury sustained while changing a light bulb is covered by the Scaffolding Law when "clearly related to, and an integral part of, the construction
work being accomplished by the workers at the site." 6 In Binetti v. MIC
West Street Co., 69 the First Department reversed an order granting sum-

mary judgment against a plaintiff who fell from a ladder while providing
a system of temporary lighting "to assist the workers on the construction
site." 70 Since the plaintiff was injured while providing lighting at a construction site, the First Department reasoned
that the protections of Sec71
tion 240(1) of the Labor Law did apply.

In fact, the routine maintenance and cleaning maintenance exception
does not appear to have a pulse at all in the First Department. In Buendia
v. New York National Bank,72 the First Department suggested that the
plain language of Labor Law Section 240(1), by including the word
"cleaning" as protected conduct, required it simply to apply the statute to

64. 607 N.Y.2d at 720-21 (citations omitted). But see Joblon, 91 N.Y.2d at 457
(eliminating requirement that accident occur in the course of construction).
65. See Clemente v. Growing Tunneling Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 922 (1st Dep't 1997).
66. See Purdie v. Crestwood Lake Heights Section Corp., 646 N.Y.S.2d 815 (2d
Dep't 1996).

67. See Cook v. Presbyterian Homes of Western New York, 655 N.Y.S.2d 701 (4th
Dep't 1996).

68. See Binetti v. MK West Street Company, 657 N.Y.S.2d 648 (lst Dep't 1997).
69. Id.

70. Id. at 649.
71. See id.
72. 637 N.Y.S.2d 70 (lst Dep't 1996).
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all cleaning, however routine.73 In Bustamante v. Chase Manhattan
Bank,74 the First Department applied Section 240(1) of the Labor Law to
cover the claim of a worker who fell from a ladder while cleaning the
tops of partitions in a bank's offices. In ruling that summary judgment
was erroneously granted to the defendant by the trial court, the First Department distinguished and limited the routine cleaning and maintenance
doctrine: "While a narrow limitation to § 240(1) exists for workers who
are injured while engaged in the routine cleaning of windows of private
residences...that limitation does not apply to workers injured while
cleaning offices." 75 Thus, since cleaning office partitions is presumably
routine cleaning, the First Department limited the Brown exception to
routine residential cleaning. In so doing, the First Department simply
76
Co.,
ignored the Court of Appeals' 1995 decision in Smith v. Shell Oil
which, as mentioned, denied the Section 240 claim of a worker who was
injured while changing a light bulb on a commercial sign at a gas station.77
C. Recent Third DepartmentCases
The Third Department, in Chapman v. IBM Corp.,78 applied the routine maintenance doctrine to affirm an order granting summary judgment
dismissing the complain of a worker who was injured in a fall from a
basketball backboard which he was trying to fix in the gymnasium of the
country club where he worked. Although the Appellate Division partially based its decision on the fact that gymnasium repairs were not part
of the plaintiff's customary job duties, the court further reasoned that the
repair to the basketball backboard was "routine maintenance in a nonconstruction, non-renovation context," and was accordingly not covered
by Section 240 of the Labor Law.79 Less than one year later, the same
court reached a contrary result in Vernum v. Zilka,80 which held that
snow and ice removal from the roof of a private residence was not rou-

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See id.
659 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1997).
Id. at 285.
654 N.E.2d 1210 (N.Y. 1995).
See supra Part IV.
649 N.Y.S.2d 228 (3d Dep't 1996).
See id. at 229.
660 N.Y.S.2d 599 (1997).
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tine cleaning and maintenance within the meaning of Section 240 of the
Labor Law, and was accordingly entitled to the statute's protection. In
holding that the statute did apply to snow and ice removal, the Third Department distinguished Brown and limited the routine cleaning and
maintenance exception to "truly domestic" household cleaning, reasoning that:
Here, plaintiff was hired to remove snow and ice, not for the
purpose of improving his employer's personal household living
conditions, but rather to protect or enhance the value of buildings
for the basis of a business or investment enterprise, or to improve
the return that could be obtained therefrom. Hence, his labor
cannot be considered "domestic" in nature, such that it could be
said to lie beyond the intended scope of the statute. In these circumstances, there is no basis for concluding that the plain language of the statute, which affords safeguards to those engaged
in the "cleaning....of a building," does not apply....8 1
Thus, the Third Department concluded that removing snow and ice
from the roof of a rented single family residence is distinguishable from
washing the windows of a residence, as was the case in the Court of Appeals' decision in Brown. In so doing, the Third Department did not attempt to distinguish the Court of Appeals' decision in Smith, which rejected the Labor Law claims of a maintenance mechanic who was
changing a light bulb at a gas station, or its own ten-month-old decision
in Chapman,82 which denied Labor Law coverage to a maintenance
worker who was injured while fixing a basketball backboard at a country
club. Rather, the court appears to have been attempting to navigate uncharted waters.
In Perchinskyv. State,8 3 a case decided the same month as Vernum v.
Zilka, the Third Department further complicated matters by holding that
the Scaffold Law did not apply to a worker who was injured while
stringing decorative wires to the walls of a state armory in preparation
for a Lions Club performance. In ruling that summary judgment should
have been granted dismissing the complaint, the Appellate Division rea-

81. Id. at 601.
82. 649 N.Y.S.2d 228.
83. 660 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep't 1997).
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soned that the plaintiffs activities in the case before it were not protected:
Similarly, in order to be entitled to the protection of Labor Law §
240(1), a worker must establish that he or she was performing
work necessary and incidental to the construction, renovation or
repair of a building or a structure.... Here, stringing wire to hang
kites as part of decorating the interior of a structure in conjunction with an entertainment/commercial enterprise is far removed
from the risks associated with the construction, renovation,
demolition or alteration of a building or structure.84
Of course, the plaintiff in Vernum v. Zilka85 was not engaged in the
"construction, renovation or repair of a building or structure,, 86 but was
simply removing snow and ice from the roof of a single family residence
in Saratoga County, an activity which would seem to be no less routine
than fixing a basketball backboard in a gym 7 or stringing decorations in
an armory. 88 Thus, applicability of the routine cleaning and maintenance
doctrine is far from settled in the Third Department. Indeed, the Third
Department's interpretations of the statute have been inconsistent with
each other.
D. Recent FourthDepartmentCases
The Fourth Department, in a string of decisions, has applied the routine maintenance and cleaning doctrine to exclude from coverage of the
Scaffold Law a variety of routine functions. For example, in Howe v.
1660 GrandIsland Boulevard Inc.,89 the Fourth Department rejected the
Section 240(1) claims of a maintenance worker who fell from a ladder
while attempting to disable an electric eye which controlled outdoor
flood lights. In ruling that the defense was entitled to summary judgment, the Fourth Department stated: "Plaintiff was not engaged in the
'repairing' or 'altering' of a 'building or structure'...but was merely per84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 180.
660 N.Y.S.2d 599.
Perchinsky, 600 N.Y.S.2d at 180.
See Chapman, 649 N.Y.S.2d 228.
See Perchinsky, 660 N.Y.S.2d 177.
619 N.Y.S.2d 227 (4th Dep't 1994).
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forming routine maintenance in a non-construction, non-renovation context.' 90 In a more recent decision, Williams v. Perkins Restaurant,Inc.,91
the plaintiff was a maintenance worker under contract to clean the
kitchen exhaust system at a restaurant when she fell from a ladder after
cleaning grease from the exhaust fans and vent. The Fourth Department
ruled that the plaintiff was involved in routine cleaning and maintenance
"in a non-construction, non-renovation context" and was thereby not entitled to the protection of the Scaffold Law. 92 A similar result was
reached in Becker v. Clearview Acres, Ltd., 93 which denied coverage
under Labor Law Section 240(1) for a plaintiff who was injured while
removing a part of a degreasing machine which was located on the floor
of a factory.
In summary, the precedents throughout the State indicate that the
routine cleaning and maintenance exception to the Scaffold Law has
been applied to limit and reject claims in the Second Department?4 and
the Fourth Department,95 but has been eschewed by the First Department,
96
which has apparently limited Smith and Brown to their respective facts.
The Third Department has both accepted and rejected the routine maintenance and cleaning defense, sometimes on logically indistinguishable
facts.97 However, as will be suggested in the following section of this
article, the entire landscape of Labor Law litigation has shifted and many
of the foregoing precedents may have to be re-evaluated
in light of the
98
Solow.
v.
Joblon
in
decision
1998
Appeals'
of
Court

90. Id.
91. 667 N.Y.S.2d 567 (4th Dep't 1997).

92. Id.
93. 656 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (4th Dep't 1997).
94. See, e.g., Bermel v. Board of Education, 647 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dep't 1996),
Haghighi v. Bailer, 657 N.Y.S.2d 77 (2d Dep't 1997).
95. See, e.g., Cook v. Presbyterian Homes of Western New York 655 N.Y.S.2d
701 (4th Dep't 1996).
96. See Bustamante v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 659 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1997).
97. Compare Vemrnum v. Zilka, 660 N.Y.S.2d 599 (3d Dep't 1997) with Perchinsky,
660 N.Y.S.2d 177 (3d Dep't 1997).
98. 695 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1998).
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V. "ALTERING" A BUILDING OR STRUCTURE WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 240: JOBLON V. SOLOW
As seen above, the characterization of any given conduct as routine
cleaning and maintenance can determine the outcome of a Labor Law
case, particularly in the Second and Fourth Departments. As was the
case with "cleaning," Section 240 of the statute explicitly mentions "altering" as a covered activity. Whether a given activity is characterized as
routine cleaning and maintenance on the one hand, or "altering" a structure on the other hand, can be conclusive of whether a contractor is
granted summary judgment dismissing the complaint, or is held absolutely liable, respectively. By way of illustration, the Second Department held, in 1993, that a plaintiff who was injured "as he was switching
cable television attachments on a utility pole" was entitled to recovery
under Section 240 of the Labor Law because the transfer of cable television service "constituted an alteration to the structure" of the pole. 99 Less
than two months later, the same court found that a telephone company
worker who had a height-related injury while splicing telephone cables in
the subway was not entitled to protection under Section 240(1) of the
Labor Law because he was engaged in "routine maintenance in a nonconstruction context."100 Thus, different results were obtained in the
same court in cases involving telephone cable and television cable.
In addition, in the definition of "altering," as was the case with routine maintenance and cleaning, there has been a divergence between the
First and Second Departments. For example, the Second Department, in
1992, held, "that the installation of an antenna on a rooftop is not an alteration within the purview of Labor Law Section 240." 101 However, the
First Department, in 1997, explicitly rejected Second Department precedent in holding that Labor Law Section 240 does apply to cover a worker
who was injured while installing a rooftop radio antenna. 10 2 Recent decisions have extended the protection of Labor Law Section 240 under the
"altering" theory to workers engaged in installing cable television,10 3 in-

99. Tauriello v. New York Telephone Company, 605 N.Y.S.2d 373,374 (2d Dep't
1993) (citations omitted).
100. Cosentino v. Long Island Railroad, 607 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1994).
101. Kesselbach v. Liberty Haulage, Inc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 739, 740 (2d Dep't 1992).
102. See Malsch v. City of New York 662 N.Y.S.2d 458 (1st Dep't 1997).
103. See Tauriello v. New York Telephone Co., 605 N.Y.S.2d 373 (2d Dep't
1993); see also, Dedario v. New York Telephone, 557 N.Y.S.2d 794 (4th Dep't 1990).
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stalling a fire alarm, °4 and installing a gas meter.105 However, the First
Department held, in 1997, that summary judgment should be granted
dismissing the complaint of a plaintiff who was injured while changing
an electrical switch on a rooftop air conditioner in order to replace a
seized electrical contact in the course of routine maintenance. 16
There has also been a disagreement among the departments as to
whether Section 240 of the Labor Law applies to workers who are injured while repairing machines on a factory floor. For example, in Cox
v. InternationalPaper, Co.,10 7 the plaintiff was injured while replacing
piping in a paper machine on the floor of a factory. The Third Department held that the plaintiff, who was employed by an independent contractor and not by the factory itself, was engaged in "altering" and not
routine maintenance of the machine, as the project of replacing the machine's pipes cost over $20,000, took several days to complete, and included the rerouting of some piping to a new location. 08 However, four
months later, a divided Fourth Department, in Becker v. ClearviewAcres,
Ltd.,109 held that summary judgment had been properly granted for the
defendant in a case in which the plaintiff was injured while removing
several components from inside a degreaser machine located on a factory
floor. Although the majority decision in Becker held that summary
judgment was appropriate since the plaintiff "was engaged in routine
maintenance in a non-construction, non-renovation context,"" 0 the dissent claimed "that, at a minimum, a factual dispute was raised by affidavits claiming that the degreaser machine in question had not been repaired in eighteen months.""'
Thus, the Court of Appeals was confronted with a Balkanized landscape when, on April 10, 1998, it issued its decision in Joblon v. Solow," 2 which defined the term "altering" within the meaning of Labor
Law Sections 240(1) and 241(6). The plaintiff in Joblon performed ongoing services as "house electrician" for commercial office space in
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Tate v. Clancy-Cullen, 575 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1st Dep't 1991).
See Golda v. Hutchinson, 632 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th Dep't 1995).
See Rowlett v. Great South Bay Assoc., 655 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1st Dep't 1997).
651 N.Y.S.2d 230 (3d Dep't 1996).
See id. at232.
656 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (4thDep't 1997).
Id. at 1001 (citations omitted).
See id.

112. 695 N.E.2d 237 (N.Y. 1998).
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which no construction was underway.' 3 The plaintiff was injured when
to run exhe fell from a ladder while chiseling a hole in a wall in order
14
tended wiring for the installation of an electric wall clock.'
The Court of Appeals, in determining a question of law certified to it
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,11 5 acknowledged that the departments of the Appellate Division had reached
inconsistent results on essentially indistinguishable facts, 11 6 and defined
"altering" as follows:
We conclude that "altering" within the meaning of Labor Law §
240(1) requires making a significantphysical change to the configuration or composition of the building or structure. Such a
rule implements the legislative purpose of providing protection
for workers, is fully consistent with our precedents and at the
we have previously
same time excludes simple, routine activities
17
placed outside the scope of the statute.'
On the facts before it, the Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by
Chief Judge Kaye, concluded that the plaintiff's conduct in chiseling a
hole through a concrete wall and extending the electrical wiring "is more
than a simple, routine activity and is significantenough to fall within the
statute."11 8 The Court rejected the defendant's argument that Section 240
of the Labor Law was restricted to accidents sustained in the course of a
building construction job, holding that the statute applies to work on
structures found away from construction sites as well.1 19 Indeed, the
Court acknowledged that Article 10 of the Labor Law was entitled
"Building Construction, Demolition and Repair Work," and that the legislative history did, in fact, make reference to ensuring safety at "building construction jobs.' 20 However, Judge Kaye wrote that prior prece-

113. See id.
114. See id.
115. Joblon v. Solow, 135 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1998). The plaintiff had commenced a
diversity action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
Joblon v. Solow, 914 F. Supp. 1044 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
116. See Joblon, 695 N.E.2d at 240.
117. Id. at241.
118. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
119. Seeid. at241.
120. Id. at 240 (quoting from 1969 Legis. Ann. at 407).
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dents had already expanded the scope of Section 240 to employees engaged in cleaning a railway car, 121 repairing an electrical sign 2 2 and
other non-construction or demolition jobs,12 3 and that should the Legislature so intend, it could explicitly limit the scope of absolute liability to
workers engaged in construction:
Defendants' complaint, that even defining "altering" as we do
today will allow too many Labor Law Section 240(1) claims to
go forward, is better addressed to the Legislature. The Legislature can, of course, revise the statute to limit its reach if it so intends (see, e.g., L. 1980, ch.670, Section 1 [creating exception
for owners of one and two-family dwellings]).124
The impact of Joblon on future Labor Law claims is difficult to predict. Since the Joblon Court held that the application of its definition of
"altering" presented a "close" question on the facts before it, 125 it would
seem logical that either knocking a hole in concrete blocks, or extending
electrical wire, without the other activity, would not pass muster under
Section 240(1). If that interpretation can be urged, Joblon could actually
represent a partial restriction in the reach of the law, as previous Appellate Division decisions have held that the installation or change of cable
television wires, in and of itself, was sufficient to constitute an alteration.1 6 Those decisions should be subject to reconsideration, as the JobIon definition would appear to require both an extension of electrical
wiring and some kind of physical change to the structure itself, e.g., a
hole in a wall. And Judge Kaye wrote in Joblon that the act of merely
2it.17
hammering a nail into a telephone pole would not suffice to "alter"
In fact, the Court of Appeals' application of the significant physical
change test to the facts before it is subject to question on the Court's own
terms. The test announced in Joblon required a significant physical
change to a "building or structure." Mr. Joblon, using a chisel, knocked a

121. See Gordon v. E. Ry. Supply, 626 N.E.2d 912 (N.Y. 1993).
122. See Izrailev v. Ficarra Furniture of Long Island, Inc., 517 N.E.2d 1318 (N.Y.

1987).
123. See Joblon, 695 N.E.2d at 240.
124. Id. at 241,n.2.

125. See id. at 241.
126. See Tauriello, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 374; see Dedario,557 N.Y.S.2d at 796.
127. See Joblon, 695 N.E.2d at 241.
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hole in a wall big enough to run an electrical wire through. This is
hardly a significant change to a commercial office building. 28 It is unlikely that Joblon's hand-chiseled hole showed up on a blueprint or required a permit from the buildings department. Thus, it is open to question whether the act of drilling one hole in the wall of a multi-story office
building should be considered an "alteration" of the building.
Thus, while Joblon clarified the law by eliminating the need for an
accident to take place on a traditional construction work site in order to
qualify for Section 240 treatment, it leaves open for interpretation which
facts would constitute a "significantphysical change to the configuration
or composition of the building or structure." This definition does little
to resolve the dispute between the First and Second Departments over
130
whether installing an antenna to the top of a building would be covered
or between the Third and Fourth Departments as to whether replacing
a
3
1
covered.1
be
would
floor
factory
a
on
machine
part in a broken
Joblon does not overrule Connors v. Boorstein132 or Brown v.
ChristopherStreet Owners Corp.133 Indeed, Judge Kaye wrote in Joblon
that the window washer in Brown would not meet the "significant physical change" test, since the definition of altering "excludes simple, routine
activities we have previously placed outside the scope of the statute. 134
Nonetheless, Joblon has eroded the precedential value of any decision
explicitly premised on the fact that the plaintiffs injury did not take

128. According to Judge Sweet's decision in the District Court, Joblon had been
working on routine assignments at the office building at 9 East 57th Street in Manhattan
for ten days prior to his accident. See Joblon, 914 F. Supp. at 1046.
129. 695 N.E.2d at 241. See, Joseph Kelner & Robert S. Kelner, Elevation-Related
Injuries and the Labor Law, N.Y. L.J., June 23, 1998, at 3 ("In Joblon, the Court has
provided a succinct definition of 'alteration,' but it is unclear whether this definition will
resolve the conflict or merely create new conflict over the interpretation of what constitutes 'significantphysical change."').
130. Compare Malsch v. City of New York, 232 A.D.2d 1 (finding altering), with
Kesselbach v. Liberty Haulage, 182 A.D.2d 741, 742 (not altering).
131. Compare Cox v. Int'l Paper Co., 651 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (finding altering),
with Becker v. Clearview Acres, 656 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (not altering).
132. 149 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1958).
133. 663 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 1996).
134. 695 N.E.2d at 241. On the other hand, the window washer in Brown was engaged in cleaning, and not "altering" so the Joblon "significant physical change" definition should be inapplicable. This dicta could engender confusion as to whether the significant physical change test should be applicable to cleaning as well.

NEW YORK LAWSCHOOL LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 44

place at a traditional construction site.1 35 Indeed, it has been held that
Joblon "eliminated the contention that to invoke Labor Law
136 Section
240(1) the particular activity must occur at a construction site."
But is that what the Legislature intended? Although contemporaneous evidence of the background to the original 1921 legislation is
scarce,137 it appears that the 1947 amendments to Section 240 were proposed to broaden its scope to include other height-related devices beside
scaffolding, "in accordance with both modem constructionpractices and
what is believed to have been the original intent of this section.' ' 138 A
1947 memorandum by the State Labor Department explaining Section
240 refers to inspection by the Labor Commissioner of "all devices used
in construction work ...
The sponsors of the 1969 amendments were clear that they sought to
ensure safety "at building construction jobs" by acknowledging that
owners and general contractors are responsible "for the erection of the
building."' 140 An accompanying memorandum of the State AFL-CIO,
which had supported and requested the bill, suggested that it was intended to protect "workers in construction, excavation and demolition
work.' 141 Indeed, the whole point of the 1969 amendment was to shift the
responsibility away from smaller subcontractors and onto larger, more
financially responsible owners and general contractors, an argument
which assumed the existence of a complex, multi-party construction
project.

135. See, e.g., Connors, 149 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 1958); Chapman, 649 N.Y.S.2d 228
(3d Dep't 1997); Cosentino, 607 N.Y.S.2d 720; Perchinsky, 660 N.Y.S. 2d 177 (3d
Dep't. 1997).
136. Lescano v. Sylvan-Lawrence, No. 10567/95, slip op. at 3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Richmond County, Sept. 29, 1998) (Mastro, J.).
137. The original 1921 bill jacket, on file in the microfilm collection at the New
York Public Library, contains no memoranda or letters interpreting the Labor Law. (N.Y.
State Library, Legislative Reference Section, Bill Jacket Collection [1921]).
138. Mem. of State Lab. Dep't, N.Y. Legis. Annual 1947 at 188 (emphasis added).
139. Id.
140. Mem. of Sen. Calandra and Assemb. Amann, N.Y.S. Legis. Annual 1969 at
407 (emphasis added).
141. Mem. of State AFL-CIO, N.Y.S. Legis. Annual 1969 at 408. The AFL-CIO
memorandum also referred to a change in Section 241 of the Labor Law, which reinstituted specific safety requirements for the planking of floors, the protection of elevator shafts, and general provisions for worksite safety. See id.
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The debate on the 1980 and 1981 amendments to Section 240 was
equally filled with references, implicit and explicit, to construction work.
For example, the State Department of Labor urged the Governor not to
sign the 1980 amendment, exempting individual homeowners from liability, because: "The workmen employed in the performance of such
work on one and two-family dwellings need that protection as much as,
142
if not more so, than workmen employed on other construction sites."
The New York County Lawyers' Association supported the same
amendment because it "exempts small homeowners from requirements to
provide suitable conditions for construction work."143 The sponsor of the
1981 amendment sought exemption for architects and engineers who are
not involved in the "physical construction or demolition of a building
and who ha[ve] no control over the methodology of the construction
safety..." 144
Moreover, the Court of Appeals has, in its prior pronouncements on
the subject, recognized the legislative intent to place "ultimate responsibility for safety practices at buildingconstructionjobs on the owner and
general contractor.145 The Connors Court observed that the statutory
protection was available to persons engaged in cleaning which146
was "inwork...
repair
and
demolition
construction,
building
to
cidental
Thus, it is apparent that the Legislature enacted and amended the Labor Law in order to impose a coherent, non-delegable duty on owners
and general contractors to provide safety protection for construction
workers involved in building and demolishing buildings and other structures. Was the Joblon court faithful to this long and well-documented
legislative history? Or did it abandon the statute's intent in an effort to
devise a bright-line test of simple application?
Viewed in the context of the Labor Law's legislative history, it is
doubtful that the plaintiff in Joblon was engaged in the sort of inherently
142. Letter from Florence Dreizen, Deputy Industrial Commissioner for Legal Affairs, Counsel's Office, State Department of Labor, to Hon. Richard A. Brown, Counsel
to the Governor, (June 27, 1980) (emphasis added) (N.Y. State Library, Legislative Reference Section, Bill Jacket Collection).
143. Letter from Richard A. Givens, Chairman, Committee on State Legislation,
New York County Lawyers' Association (June 17, 1980) (N.Y. State Library, Legislative
Reference Section, Bill Jacket Collection).
144. Mem. of Assemb. Angelo F. Orazio, N.Y.S. Legis. Annual 1981 at 139.
145. Zimmer v. Chemung Co. Performing Arts, 482 N.E.2d 898 (N.Y. 1985) (emphasis added) (citing 1969 N.Y. Legis. Ann. at 407).
146. Connors v. Boorstein, 149 N.E.2d 721, 723 (N.Y. 1958).
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hazardous activity for which the extraordinary protection of absolute liability should be imposed. Joblon himself was hired as a house electrician to perform ongoing services in an office. 147 He fell from a ladder
which he himself failed to secure while chiseling a hole in a wall in order
to install an electrical clock. 148 No construction was ongoing. Joblon's
work was controlled by his supervisor, presumably a master electrician,
and not by any representative of the owner, who may not have been
aware that Joblon was climbing up on an unsecured ladder in a small,
dark closet.
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand what public
policy would be advanced by preventing the building owner from asserting, and the jury from considering, Joblon's comparative negligence,
which appears to have been considerable. Is it fair and reasonable to expect the building owner to anticipate that an electrician would decide to
use an unsecured ladder to perform the routine installation of an electrical clock? Rather, it seems inconsistent with the legislative intent to afford a "house electrician" the same legal benefits and protections which
have been found necessary for construction workers who are ordered to
scale unprotected and exposed scaffolding. The same question can be
raised of other applications of strict liability in a non-construction context, such as cleaning the tops of office partitions 149 or removing snow
and ice from the roof of a private residence.150 Clearly, these cases are
not consistent with the legislative intent any more than was the case in
Joblon.
By the same token, where is the legislative support for the routine
cleaning and maintenance exception? After all, the Legislature chose the
words "altering, painting, cleaning or pointing" in 1921, and the same
language has survived to this day. The legislative history is bereft of any
intention to limit the law's reach to any one particular kind of cleaning.
The courts which devised the routine cleaning and maintenance exception did so as a matter of common sense, in order to avoid the absurd
result of affording strict liability to the case of any employee who falls
from a step stool while changing a lightbulb or washing a window or
cleaning an office partition.
147. SeeJoblon, 695 N.E.2d at 239.
148. See id.
149. See Bustamante v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 659 N.Y.S.2d 284 (lst Dep't

1997).
150. See Vermnum v. Zilka, 660 N.Y.S.2d 599 (3d Dep't 1997).
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Thus, the Court of Appeals was probably correct when it wrote in
1958 that the statutory term "cleaning" refers "to the cleaning incidental
to building construction, demolition and repair work... ' 151 By this analysis, it should not matter whether the cleaning is "routine"' 52 or the alteration is "significant."' 153 What the Legislature intended was to protect
workers who climb on scaffolds at construction sites, however routine or
humble the task. In this regard, the First Department was probably on
the right track when it applied Section 240 to the case of a plaintiff who
fell from a ladder while providing temporary lighting at a construction
site, 154 notwithstanding the routine nature of his work. Furthermore, the
Third Department honored the legislative intent when it wrote that, "in
order to be entitled to the protection of Labor Law § 240(1), a worker
must establish that he or she was performing work necessary and incidental to the construction, renovation or repair of a building or structure."'155
Thus, it appears that the most faithful rendering of the legislative intent would be to provide coverage under Section 240 for all heightrelated work, however routine and humble, at a construction site, and to
require workers in a non-construction setting to prove negligence in order to recover. Perhaps then, the Legislature should consider the Court
of Appeals' invitation 156 to revisit the reach of the Labor Law's strict
liability provisions, and narrow their applicability to actual construction
work. At the same time, it could eliminate, as unnecessary, the routine
cleaning and maintenance exception.

151. Connors v. Boorstein, 149 N.E.2d at 723 (denying claim of domestic worker
injured while cleaning windows).
152. Brown v. Christopher Street Owners Corp., 663 N.E.2d 1251 (N.Y. 1996).
153. Joblon, 695 N.E.2d at 239.
154. See Binetti v. MK W. St. Co., 657 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (Ist Dep't 1997).
155. Perchinsky, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 180. See also Cosentino v. Long Island RR., 607
N.Y.S.2d 720, 721 (2d Dep't 1994) ("In view of the strict liability imposed by the statute
and the fact that such liability generally is imposed only to guard against inordinate dangers, we find no reason to strain the language of the statute to encompass the routine
activities involved with telephone service, which is clearly distinguishable from the risks
associated with the constructionor demolition of a building.") (emphasis added).

156. See Joblon, 695 N.E.2d at 241, n.2.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The application of Labor Law Section 240 by the various departments of the Appellate Division has been largely inconsistent. The judicially-created exception for routine maintenance and cleaning has been
applied consistently by the Second and Fourth Departments, all but ignored in the First Department, and partially adopted, with blatantly inconsistent results, in the Third Department. As a result, the benefit of
absolute liability has been extended to workers injured while shoveling
snow, 157 changing light fixtures, 15 8 and cleaning office partitions, 5 9 but
denied to workers splicing telephone cable wires, 160 deactivating elevators, 161 or repairing a paper machine on a factory floor.' 62 Given these
widely divergent results among the different departments, the issue is
abundantly ripe for clarification by the Court of Appeals or the Legislature. Insofar as the Legislature never intended absolute liability to be
extended to every routine workplace accident, it is likely that some version of the routine cleaning and maintenance exception will continue to
exist, unless Joblon is legislatively overruled.
The Court of Appeals' 1998 decision in Joblon has removed the requirement that an accident take place on a traditional construction site in
order to qualify for Section 240 coverage, thereby expanding the scope
of absolute liability to protect any worker who sustains a height-related
injury while making a significant alteration to a building or structure.
The Legislature should consider whether the Court of Appeals has interpreted the Labor Law too broadly, beyond the original intent to protect
construction workers who ascend scaffolds at building construction sites.
The Joblon "significant physical change" test should narrow the
scope of activities previously classified as alterations. A domestic
worker who falls from a ladder while washing windows or changing a
light bulb will still be engaged in simple, routine activities, and will not
be aided by Joblon. Whether a given activity is protected altering or unprotected maintenance will continue to be adjudicated on a case-by-case
basis. It is hoped that this article, by outlining the inconsistencies in the
157.
158.
159.
160.

Vernum, 660 N.Y.S.2d. 599 (3d Dep't 1997).
Clemente v. Growing Tunneling Corp., 653 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1997).
Bustamante, 659 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1st Dep't 1997).
Cosentino, 607 N.Y.S.2d 720 (2d Dep't 1994).

161. See Vanerstrom, 659 N.Y.S.2d at 78.
162. See Becker, 656 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
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various departments, will help promote uniformity in application of the
law, and interpretation of this important legislation in a manner consistent with its original intent.

